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Unraveling the effects of environmental outcomes and processes on 
financial performance: A non-linear approach 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the roles of the outcome and process dimensions of environmental performance 
in determining financial performance as measured by Tobin’s q. Outcomes refer to the 
impacts of the firm on the natural environment, while processes are the firm’s actions to 
reduce these outcomes. We focus on a specific outcome—carbon emissions—and suggest that 
it affects Tobin’s q non-linearly. We find that firms achieve the highest financial performance 
when their carbon performance is neither low nor high, but intermediate. We also find that 
environmental processes moderate this relationship as they reinforce firms’ financial 
performance through improved stakeholder management. This mixed picture suggests that 
firms do not generally internalize the costs of poor carbon performance, but those that stand 
out in both environmental outcomes and processes achieve net financial benefits. These 
findings are based on a sample of carbon-intensive firms that disclosed their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions through the Carbon Disclosure Project from 2007 through 2013.  
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Despite 25 years of intense research, the link between the firm’s environmental and financial 
performance remains a subject of intense interest and debate both in economics and 
management. From the early works of Porter (1991), Jaggi and Freedman (1992), and 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) to the meta-analyses studies conducted by Margolis and Walsh 
(2003), Orlitzsky et al. (2003), and more recently Horváthová (2010) and Albertini (2013), 
scholars have advanced theoretical arguments to support or reject the hypothesis that “it pays 
to be green.”  
The extant research yields contradictory results, suggesting that corporate actions to 
offset environmental pollution are likely to pay off (e.g., Christmann, 2004; Hart and Ahuja, 
1996; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Wagner 2010), that environmental and 
financial performance are negatively associated (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Cordeiro and 
Sarkis, 1997; Walley and Whitehead, 1994), that there is no significant relationship between 
the variables (King and Lenox, 2002), and that the causality is unclear (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003). Similarly, most meta-analyses find that environmental performance is positively, but 
weakly, correlated with financial performance, although the variation in results across studies 
is significant. 
The lack of conclusive results has led many scholars to reformulate the research 
question into when and how it “pays to be green,” and to focus on the conditions that drive 
this relation and allow firms to capitalize on sustainability-oriented efforts (Ambec and 
Lanoie, 2008; Orsato, 2006). Moreover, some scholars highlight the necessity of clarifying 
the reliability and validity of the focal constructs analyzed (Walls et al., 2011). 
In this paper, we build on the literature that distinguishes between the process and 
outcome dimensions of environmental performance (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Delmas et 
al., 2013) to study its relationship to financial performance. Environmental processes include 
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firms’ initiatives to address environmental problems (e.g., environmental management 
systems or cleaner technologies). Environmental outcomes capture the firm’s impact on the 
natural environment (e.g., carbon emissions, pollution, and waste). Delmas et al. argued that 
“companies may excel at reporting, governance, and the utilization of environmental 
performance systems but still emit substantial amounts of pollution.” (2013: 263). The 
reasons are that firms may be ineffective in their efforts, that it may take time for investments 
in environmental practices to produce benefits, or even that firms act for merely symbolic 
purposes to influence markets without achieving substantial improvements in environmental 
outcomes (Bansal and Clelland, 2004).  
We focus on a specific outcome, carbon emissions, since climate change and carbon 
management have become important determinants of corporate strategy and acquired the 
potential to impact the bottom line through regulatory and stakeholders’ pressures (Howard-
Grenville et al., 2014; Reid and Toffel, 2009). Compared to other outcomes or environmental 
performance in general, research on the impact of carbon emissions on financial performance 
is relatively underdeveloped, even though recent contributions have begun clarifying it (e.g., 
Busch and Hoffman, 2011; Hatakeda et al., 2012; Iwata and Okada, 2011). Using a non-linear 
approach, we contribute to this nascent literature by hypothesizing and testing an interaction 
between carbon emissions and environmental processes in determining firm financial 
performance. 
Many scholars have countered the dominant assumption of linearity in studies on the 
relationship between environmental and financial performance (Brammer and Millington, 
2008; Marcus and Fremeth, 2009; Wagner et al., 2002). Barnett and Salomon (2012) provided 
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between corporate social performance and financial 
performance, showing that while engaging with socially and environmentally responsible 
practices is initially costly for firms, after a certain point, these costs are paid off and offset by 
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the benefits from improved relations with stakeholders.  
Regarding carbon emissions, Tatsuo (2010), Hatakeda et al. (2012), and Fujii et al. 
(2013) tested a U-shaped relationship in the context of Japanese manufacturing firms. 
However, these studies did not consider the interaction between outcome and process 
dimensions and used accounting measures of the dependent variable (such as ROA or ROS). 
In this paper, we measure financial performance through Tobin’s q, which captures a firm’s 
future stream of earnings, incorporating the expected long-term benefits of improved 
environmental outcomes and processes. Busch and Hoffmann (2011) studied the interaction 
between carbon emissions and environmental processes, but did not include non-linear 
effects. To our knowledge, Tobin’s q has not yet been used to estimate a non-linear 
relationship between carbon emissions and financial performance. 
To test our hypotheses, we studied a sample of 127 global firms that operate in carbon 
intensive industries (energy, materials, industrial, and utilities) and reported their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) between 2007 and 2013. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the extant literature and develop 
our hypotheses. In Section 3, we present our data, describe our methodology, and discuss the 
results. We provide our conclusions in Section 4. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1. Environmental performance: process versus outcome 
Stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984) is often employed to 
explain differences in firm’s financial performance with regard to environmental issues (e.g., 
Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Wagner, 2011). Several scholars observed that stakeholders tend to 
favor relationships with companies that are more aligned to their expectations. For example, 
CSR practices tend to increase customers’ trust (Castaldo et al., 2009); responsible consumers 
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are willing to pay a premium price for more sustainable products (Brown and Dacin, 1997); 
employees are attracted and motivated by companies that are environmentally and socially 
conscious (Brammer et al., 2007); policy makers may reduce their regulatory, legislative, or 
fiscal pressures for responsible companies (Hillman and Keim, 2001); and sustainable firms 
can attract financial investors (Doh et al., 2010). The benefits for firms are expected to depend 
on the capacity to respond to and influence stakeholders (Barnett, 2007). On one hand, 
attention to environmental and social issues can provide important resources, offsetting the 
costs of initiatives (Brammer and Millington, 2008). On the other hand, for firms that lack the 
ability to build valuable ties with stakeholders, the costs of initiatives can be superior to the 
benefits, decreasing financial performance. 
A further complexity is that stakeholders can react differently to different dimensions 
of a firm’s environmental performance. Recent contributions highlighted the difference 
between process and outcome measures (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Delmas et al., 2013). 
These are a reaction to empirical studies that “have often blurred the lines between 
environmental management and environmental performance” (Walls et al., 2011: 74), for 
example, using pollution as a proxy for a firm’s environmental management strategy, or 
adopting environmental management systems as proxies of emissions. Similar studies are 
methodologically suspicious because, as Delmas et al. (2013) remark, “Process measures 
indicate the efforts a company invests in attempting to mitigate its environmental impacts. 
Although process measures represent a potential for improvement in outcome performance, 
there is no guarantee that such improvements will indeed materialize” (258). 
While the theoretical distinction between process and outcome measures is well 
established, there is no consensus on the impacts of these dimensions on a firm’s financial 
performance. Delmas et al. (2013) determined that corporate financial performance is 
positively and linearly associated with process measures but not with outcome measures. 
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Busch and Hoffmann (2011) theorized that better environmental outcomes linearly and 
positively translate into superior financial performance while environmental processes 
moderate the relationship, such that these processes increase financial performance when 
outcomes are low but decrease financial performance when outcomes are high. However, 
their data did not support the expected moderation.  
When examining environmental outcomes, it is important to consider that there may 
be many types such as air emissions, water emissions, waste, resource consumption, and 
effects on ecosystems. Each type can affect financial performance with a different sign or 
strength. Iwata and Okada argue, “each environmental issue has different characteristics such 
as the scope of pollution (e.g., local or global), length of time until damages emerge, severity 
of the damages, facilities for specifying the polluters, and existence of regulations and 
international treaties. These various characteristics suggest that different stakeholders may 
place emphasis on different environmental issues” (2011: 1692). 
Building on stakeholder theory, stakeholder interest in different environmental 
problems and the firm’s ability to provide responses may affect financial performance in 
different ways, thus leading to mixed results. Accordingly, we isolate a single environmental 
outcome. Following Busch and Hoffmann (2011), we focus on a measure—carbon 
emissions—that reflects a firms’ contribution to climate change, a broadly relevant issue for 
business, policy makers, and stakeholders. Climate change has become a strategic issue for 
companies, and carbon performance is one of the most relevant, non-financial piece of 
information collected by stakeholders (Eccles et al., 2011).  
 
2.2. Environmental performance: non-linear effects on financial performance 
The view of a non-linear relationship between environmental and financial performance 
emerged with Wagner et al. (2001 and 2002), who argued that the “environmental and 
7 
 
economic performance of firms does not have to be unidirectional but can change from 
positive to negative, or vice versa” (2001: 99). They continued that “the relationship between 
environmental and economic performance can be represented through a bell-shaped (i.e., 
inverse U-shaped) curve” (2001: 99). Brammer and Millington (2008) proposed a more 
articulated framework of these linkages, and introduced two descriptive models based on non-
linear relationships. In one, the positive financial payoffs to good social performance are 
subject to diminishing and eventually decreasing returns. This suggests an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between social and economic performance. In the other model, they associated 
high financial performance with either very high or very low levels of social performance, 
implying a U-shaped curve. Subsequently, Barnett and Salomon (2012) found evidence of a 
U-shaped relationship between social and financial performance. In particular, they observed 
that benefits vary across the range of corporate social performance, such that when the 
capacity to influence stakeholders accumulates, benefits are generated that balance and then 
exceed the costs of socially responsible initiatives. 
Focusing on Japanese companies or those listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, recent 
studies on environmental and financial performance also tested a curvilinear relationship, 
using carbon emissions as a measure of environmental outcomes. Tatsuo (2010), investigating 
a sample of manufacturing firms in three industries (chemical, food, and electrical 
equipment), identified an inverse U-shape relationship between CO2 emissions and ROA. In 
other words, “efforts to increase environmental performance will bring economic benefit, but 
eventually improvement of environmental performance will push up economic costs, 
implying the two performances will no longer coexist” (219). Hatakeda et al. (2012) 
investigated the relationship between GHG and profitability, considering various factors that 
can affect the benefit of reducing carbon emissions, such as market competition or 
uncertainty. They found a non-linear relationship between environmental and financial 
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performance, and argued that the difference between marginal revenue and cost of reducing 
emissions is heterogeneous across individual firms. Finally, Fujii et al. (2013) addressed the 
question of economic performance versus environmental performance as measured by CO2. 
They identified both a positive linear effect of environmental performance on ROA and a 
positive quadratic relationship with ROS, concluding that environmental performance affects 
ROA by means of ROS. Explaining this relationship, they suggested that firms improve their 
overall economic performance through increased energy efficiency.  
To summarize, a growing interest in the non-linear relationship between financial 
performance and carbon emissions has emerged. Scholars tested both positive and negative 
quadratic functions. However, none used Tobin’s q as a dependent variable, even though it is 
widely used in studies on the impact of environmental performance on firm’s economic 
results (King and Lenox, 2002; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Wagner, 2011). Tobin’s q anticipates 
the future streams of firm cash flows expected by the stock market over and above the value 
that is already in the book value of firm assets (Kor and Mahoney, 2005). As such, it captures 
expected long-term benefits of emission-reducing firm investments (e.g., improved reputation 
or lower regulatory risk). Therefore, using Tobin’s q to study the non-linear relationship 
between carbon emissions and financial performance allows covering the costs and benefits 
not immediately reflected in such short-term accounting measures as ROA or ROE. 
 
2.3. Effects of carbon performance on Tobin’s q 
Addressing climate change requires actions like introducing innovations to increase the 
energy efficiency of production processes, the shift towards low-carbon energy technologies, 
or implementing compensation measures like emission credits (Busch and Hoffmann, 2007; 
Kolk and Pinkse, 2005). These actions use resources and entail investments that negatively 
impact the firm’s financial performance, unless economic benefits materialize. In this regard, 
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it is important to notice that carbon emissions do not directly generate costs for firms 
operating in regulatory regimes that do not internalize these emissions. Although various 
carbon-trading schemes and carbon taxes were implemented in some states and regions, the 
internalized costs of carbon emission appear to be very low when measured, for example, in 
terms of the market price of carbon (The Economist, 2013).  
Therefore, firms with poor carbon performance (high emissions) are in a position to 
outperform rivals that make costly investments and engage in innovation to reduce their 
carbon footprints. Apart from regulatory interventions, the only sources of higher costs for 
firms with poor performance are reputation or legitimacy losses, which may lead to higher 
costs or lower revenues. Although such losses can be large, especially for highly visible firms 
under public scrutiny, they will mostly be lower than the savings associated with a lack of 
action against climate change. Therefore, we predict that low carbon performance will be 
associated with a higher Tobin’s q, or generally with better financial performance. 
When a firm improves its carbon performance through carbon-efficient investments 
and interventions, its costs increase, while rivals still benefit from avoiding expenditures. The 
initial costs can be substantial, because firms must acquire new competencies and 
technologies (Marcus and Fremeth, 2009). At the same time, carbon performance is still too 
low for relevant stakeholders to notice. Brammer and Millington observed that firms “that 
make moderate levels of investment in social performance neither save the resources for 
alternative investments nor achieve differentiation in the eyes of stakeholders” (2008: 1329). 
Therefore, we argue that intermediate carbon performance will be associated with lower 
financial performance. 
Finally, building on Barnett and Salomon (2012), when firms accumulate a certain 
level of investment in low carbon initiatives, the accrued capacity to respond to stakeholders 
starts to generate positive net returns. Reinhardt (1998) and Orsato (2006) suggested that high 
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environmental performance might enhance product differentiation, allowing the firm to apply 
premium prices or win new customers. Similarly, investors can see “superior corporate carbon 
performance (outcome based) as a virtue: firms with lower carbon intensity can generate a 
“carbon premium” (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011: 253). These benefits add to the savings 
resulting from learning effects and new capabilities that allow the firm to introduce valuable 
innovations (Fujii et al., 2013). Thus, costs related to carbon reduction initiatives are 
progressively offset. We hypothesize that the relationship between carbon performance and 
Tobin’s q is U-shaped, with the highest values for financial performance reached at the lowest 
and highest levels of carbon performance:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between a firm’s carbon performance and financial 
performance is curvilinear (U-shaped), such that higher financial performance occurs 
at the two extremes of carbon performance. 
 
2.4. The moderation effect of environmental process 
Environmental processes signal to observers that a firm wishes to mitigate its external 
impacts. These are usually more difficult to measure than outcomes (Delmas et al., 2013), and 
only represent the potential for improvement—there is no guarantee that an improvement will 
actually materialize. In addition, environmental processes do not always indicate a true 
strategic commitment, because institutional pressures may lead firms to adopt practices for the 
primary purpose of achieving legitimacy, rather than reducing impacts per se (Bansal and 
Clelland, 2004). 
However, environmental processes may be important ways to improve relationships 
with stakeholders and to influence them. They cover a broad range of activities including the 
development of ecofriendly innovations, modification of manufacturing processes, or 
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introduction of environmental management systems. These figure prominently in 
sustainability reports, avoid or reduce grievances by aggressive stakeholders, alleviate 
regulatory risks, and contribute to the firm’s Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
rating, which improves the amount and stability of demand for its shares in the stock market. 
This leads us to suggest that environmental processes moderate the relationship 
between the firm’s carbon emissions and its Tobin’s q. When carbon performance is low and 
the reputation and legitimacy of a firm are at risk, environmental processes can be used 
symbolically to modify stakeholder perceptions and influence financial markets. The fact that 
these processes are not accompanied by corresponding carbon performance does not weaken 
their effects, as stakeholders expect improvements to take time. Therefore, at low levels of 
carbon performance, environmental processes improve Tobin’s q because of investors’ 
positive evaluation of the actions taken. 
In contrast, the benefits of environmental processes at moderate levels of carbon 
performance are negligible, because there is little need for a firm to sustain its reputation or 
legitimacy. Therefore, the costs of the actions taken are not recouped, and the net effect on 
Tobin’s q is negative.  
When the firm’s carbon performance is high, environmental processes demonstrate to 
observers that the firm is highly committed to environmental issues and that its approach 
covers both the outcome and process dimensions. Such a “best-in-class” approach allows the 
firm to attain full support by stakeholders in all business activities, enjoy the reputation and 
legitimacy benefits derived from excellence in overall environmental performance, and even 
achieve internal efficiencies or resource-saving innovations. 
In summary, at low and high levels of carbon performance, the level of adoption of 
environmental processes reinforces the impact of carbon performance on Tobin’s q. At 
intermediate levels of carbon performance, a high level of adoption will be associated with a 
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lower Tobin’s q: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental processes moderate the curvilinear (U-shaped) 
relationship between carbon performance and financial performance, such that at low 
and high levels of carbon performance, high levels of environmental management 
enhance financial performance, while at intermediate levels of carbon performance, 
high levels of environmental management reduce financial performance.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
Our sample was created from the list of organizations that disclosed their GHG emissions 
through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) from 2007 through 2013. CDP is an 
independent not-for-profit organization that collects and discloses information on 
organizations’ GHG emissions and how they address climate change in their strategies and 
operations (CDP, 2013). Previous research has already drawn on CDP information (Kolk and 
Pinske, 2007; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Lewis et al., 2013; Ionnaou et al., 2014). 
The initial list included 998 organizations that reported GHG emissions between 2007 
and 2013. We then removed non-profit organizations and companies not listed on stock 
exchanges, as our main dependent variable was Tobin’s q. Companies that radically changed 
scope of operations in the focal period through M&A transactions or spin-offs were also 
excluded. Finally, we focused on those industries responsible for significant amounts of GHG 
emissions, namely the energy, materials, industrials, and utilities industries. The absence of 
data for GHG emissions and other variables reduced the number of usable firm-year 
observations to 766 over the 2007 to 2013 period, including 127 companies. The panel is 
unbalanced. Financial data and other firm information were obtained from Thomson 
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Datastream. Table 1 reports the industry and country composition of the sample. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Firms participating in CDP disclose their emissions according to the GHG Protocol, 
which was developed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). This protocol defines three scopes for 
accounting and reporting purposes: Scope 1 includes GHG emissions from sources that the 
firm owns or operationally controls. These are direct emissions from activities such as 
electricity generation, physical or chemical processing, and fuel combustion. Scope 2 includes 
indirect GHG emissions whose source is the electricity that a firm purchases to conduct its 
own operations. Scope 3 includes all other indirect GHG emissions from sources that the firm 
does not own or operationally control, such as the transportation of materials bought by the 
firm or emissions related to the products and services it sells. 
We focused on Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions. Including both scopes allows to 
consider all of the most important operational changes by the firm, investments, and 
innovations that impact GHG emissions, including switching to electricity suppliers that use 
renewable sources. Previous studies also covered both scopes (e.g., Busch and Hoffmann, 
2011). In some industries, Scope 3 emissions are also representative of firm efforts to reduce 
carbon impacts (e.g., car emissions in the automobile industry). However, we excluded this 
category because few firms reported relevant data to the CDP. 
Aligned to previous literature (Hoffmann and Busch, 2008), we defined our measure 
of Carbon performance as the ratio of the firm’s Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions to sales. 
Then, we divided this value by the industry average (defined at the sub-industry level) of the 
firm, since carbon performance is highly industry-dependent. A logarithmic transformation 
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was applied to avoid skewness. Finally, we multiplied the results by (-1) and rescaled them on 
a positive range of values, so that larger values of this measure express better performance 
(i.e., lower carbon emissions). 
Our Environmental management variable reflects the environmental processes firms 
adopted to reduce environmental impacts through their operations (e.g., cleaner technologies) 
and organizational policies (e.g., creating committees or incentives). Previous literature tried 
to quantify these efforts using count variables that mainly cover organizational policies (e.g., 
Busch and Hoffmann, 2011). We adopted the alternative approach of employing externally 
validated measures. The measure we used is the Environmental Performance Score calculated 
by Thomson-Reuters in its Asset4 database, which includes a large number of ESG indicators 
(Thomson-Reuters, 2014). Analysts use stock-exchange filings, news sources, financial 
statements, and other sources (including CDP data) to collect information on 900 data points 
of more than 3,500 firms. The data is converted into units that enable the calculation of scores 
ranging from 0 to 100, which represent a firm’s performance in a given dimension relative to 
the entire Asset4 universe in a year. The Asset4 scores have been used in other studies (Cheng 
et al., 2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Luo et al., 2014). 
The Environmental Performance Score reflects “how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental 
opportunities in order to generate long term shareholder value” (Thomson-Reuters, 2014). 
The items used to calculate the score cover interventions (such as emission-reduction policies 
or the percentage of firm sites that are certified as complying with an environmental 
management system) and outcomes (such as the volume of hazardous waste or CO2 and CO2-
equivalent emissions). Therefore, the Environmental Performance Score overlaps with our 
carbon-performance measure, which is based on CO2 emissions. The overlap is small, as 
shown by the pairwise correlation between the two measures in our sample (.17, p < .001). 
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However, we eliminated the overlap by regressing the Environmental Performance Score on 
our measure of carbon performance and saving the residuals. These residuals represent the 
variance in the Score that is not explained by the firm’s carbon performance. To ease 
interpretation, we rescaled the residuals on a positive range of values, thereby obtaining our 
Environmental management measure, which we use as a proxy of the firm’s environmental 
processes. 
Our main measure of financial performance is Tobin’s q, which we calculated by 
dividing the sum of the firm’s market capitalization, the book value of its long-term debt, and 
its net current liabilities by the book value of its total assets (King and Lenox, 2002). To make 
our results comparable to previous literature, we analyzed other dependent variables: return 
on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), and return on assets (ROA). Following mainstream 
definitions, ROE was calculated as the net income divided the shareholder’s equity; ROS as 
the operating income divided by total sales; and ROA as the net income divided by total 
assets. 
In addition to Carbon performance and Environmental management, we used several 
controls to predict financial performance. To control for country effects, we included a full set 
of dummies (one for each country). With regard to year effects, we included six dummy 
variables (from 2007 to 2012). Industry effects were controlled by three sector-level dummies 
(materials, industry, utilities), leaving the energy industry as the baseline case. The natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets was included to control for firm Size, as research has 
shown that firm size is an antecedent of firm responses to environmental issues (Darnall et al., 
2010; King and Lenox, 2002; Sarkis and Cordeiro, 2001). 
As our Environmental Management measure is based on Asset4’s Environmental 
Performance Score, it could vary with other ESG indicators that may independently affect the 
firm’s Tobin’s q, thereby producing spurious correlations. Thus, we added Asset4’s 
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Corporate Governance Score as a control. This measures “a company’s systems and 
processes, which ensure that its board members and executives act in the best interests of its 
long term shareholders” (Thomson-Reuters, 2014). Therefore, it potentially impacts investors’ 
views of the firm, which in turn influence our main dependent variable (Tobin’s q).  
Based on the same logic, we added a dummy variable that took the value 1 if a firm 
adhered to the United Nations’ Global Compact within a year, and 0 otherwise. This program, 
which encourages firms to embrace 10 principles in the areas of human rights, labor, 
environmental protection, and anti-corruption, is the largest voluntary corporate responsibility 
initiative in the world (Rasche et al., 2013). Participation in this program is frequently used as 
a proxy for social performance (e.g., Soleimani et al., 2014). 
Firms can use technological innovation to address environmental issues (Berrone et al. 
2013). The development of new products, processes, or services is crucial for reducing GHG 
emissions. Moreover, long-standing research—starting with Griliches (1981)—shows that 
Tobin’s q is sensitive to R&D and patents. We therefore included a variable that measures 
patents connected to climate change. Data were taken from the European Patent Office’s 
(EPO) Espacenet database, which contains 70 million patent documents issued worldwide 
(EPO, 2014). We examined documents tagged with the Y02 codes (Veefkind et al., 2012), 
which cover documents dealing with the capture, storage, sequestration, or disposal of GHGs 
(Y02C) and the reduction of GHGs emitted through energy generation, transmission, or 
distribution (Y02E). Our indicator, Climate change innovation, was obtained by calculating 
the ratio of “climate change patents” (Y02 codes) to the total number of patents granted to a 
firm in a year, and standardized relative to the average of the same ratio for the firms in the 
same sub-industry. Values larger than 1 mean that the firm outperforms its industry peers, 
while values below 1 indicate the opposite. This variable controls for technological innovation 
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in climate change mitigation not directly recognized in the Environmental management 
measure. 
We included R&D intensity following McWilliams and Siegel (2000), who 
emphasized this as a potentially confounding variable when exploring the relationship 
between social or environmental performance and financial performance. We calculated R&D 
intensity by dividing R&D expenses by total sales (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). 
Debt/equity ratio was included as a proxy of the firm’s riskiness, which could 
influence its market value (Choi and Wang, 2009). Riskiness is commonly used as a control 
in research on Tobin’s q (Lu and Beamish, 2004). The value of this variable is the ratio of the 
firm’s debt to shareholders’ equity. 
Table 2 displays the descriptions of the variables. ROE, ROS, and ROA were 
winsorized at the 5% level to mitigate the impact of extreme values (see Roberts and Sufi, 
2009, for a similar procedure).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix as well as the means and standard deviations of 
the variables. The highest correlations are between the dependent variables (Tobin’s q, ROE, 
ROS, and ROA). All correlations between predictor variables are comfortably between −.70 
and .70, an interval within which collinearity is unlikely to be a problem (Bedeian, 2014). We 
also examined variance inflation factors (not reported) to test for multi-collinearity. As none 
approached the usually accepted threshold of 10 (Neter et al., 1990), we concluded that multi-
collinearity is not an issue in our data. 
-------------------------------- 






We used hierarchical ordinary least square (OLS) regression to test both hypotheses. Our 
basic specification, expressed in reduced form, is as follows: 
 
FPit = α + β1CPit + β2CPit2 + β3EMit + β4CPitEMit + β5CPit2EMit + δΖit + εit 
 
where i denotes firms and t periods. FP is financial performance, CP is Carbon performance, 
EM is Environmental management, δ is a vector of parameters, and Z is a vector of control 
variables including industry, year, and country dummies, Size, R&D intensity, Debt/equity, 
Corporate Governance Score, UN Global Compact, and Climate change innovation. 
Finally, ε is the error term. 
Furthermore, we tested an alternative specification in which financial performance is 
lagged to t + 1. Slack resource theory (Waddock and Graves, 1997) implies that Tobin’s q can 
be a cause and not only a consequence of firm actions that address climate change. As such, it 
may give rise to simultaneity or endogeneity issues. Lagging the dependent variable with 
respect to explanatory variables allows alleviating these issues.  
 
4. Results 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of our specification, using Tobin’s q as the dependent 
variable. Model 1 includes all the control variables, showing that the industrials and utilities 
industries have significantly lower Tobin’s q than the baseline case (energy). As expected, 
R&D intensity correlates positively with Tobin’s q, while Climate change innovation has no 
statistically significant effect. Somewhat surprisingly, participation in the UN Global 
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Compact is significantly and negatively correlated with Tobin’s q. The coefficients of other 
controls are not statistically significant. All these results are confirmed in the subsequent 
models. 
Model 2 adds our variables of interest: Carbon performance, its quadratic term (to test 
for a curvilinear relationship with Tobin’s q), and Environmental management. The increase 
in model fit is statistically significant (.0053, p < .001). The coefficients of both the linear and 
the quadratic term of Carbon performance are statistically significant; however, the 
coefficients are respectively positive and negative, indicating an inverse U-shape. This 
provides evidence against Hypothesis 1, in which we argued a U-shape. 
In Model 3, to test Hypothesis 2, we added the interactions between Environmental 
management and the carbon-performance terms. Both interactions are statistically significant 
(p < .001). Their signs suggest an inversion of the U-shape (that is, a positive U-shape) for 
firms with the highest levels of Environmental management. Generally, interaction effects are 
only deemed significant if they explain a greater portion of the variance in the dependent 
variable than a model that includes only the main effects (Aguinis and Gottfredson, 2010). 
The size of the R2 increase in Model 4 (.0082) and the F-test (p < .001) indicate that this is the 
case in our data. Models 4, 5, and 6 are similar to Models 1, 2, and 3 respectively, but Tobin’s 
q is lagged forward by 1 year. The results are qualitatively the same as in the non-lagged 
models. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
To facilitate interpretation of the main and moderation effects, we plotted the 
relationship between Carbon performance and Tobin’s q (Figure 1). The standard deviations 
on the horizontal axis cover the range of actual carbon-performance values in our sample. The 
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graph indicates an inverse U-shape for average values of Environmental management. For 
firms with Environmental management values that are one standard deviation above the mean, 
the U-shape is positive, meaning that low and high levels of Carbon performance lead to a 
higher Tobin’s q, while moderate levels of Carbon performance are associated with a low 
Tobin’s q. For firms with Environmental management values that are one standard deviation 
below the mean, the opposite effect is seen: the U-shape is inverted and the slope is more 
negative than for firms with average levels of Environmental management. These effects 
amount to the moderation effect we predicted in Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 1 is disconfirmed 
as a whole, even though it holds limitedly for firms with high levels of Environmental 
management. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The inverse U-shape we found also opposes findings of a positive U-shape in previous 
research, most notably in Barnett and Salomon (2012). However, this study used a 
comprehensive measure of social performance (based on KLD data) that conflates outcome 
and process dimensions. An inverse U-shape previously emerged in the study on carbon 
emissions by Japanese firms in Tatsuo (2010). Importantly, the main effect of Environmental 
management on Tobin’s q is positive and statistically significant. While this is in line with 
Delmas et al. (2013), it disconfirms Busch and Hoffmann (2011), who found that 
environmental processes were negatively associated to financial performance. 
To further investigate the moderating role of Environmental management, we divided 
the sample into two groups based on a median split for this variable. Firms above or equal to 
the median score were coded 1, while those below were coded 0. We ran a reduced version of 
the full specification without Environmental management and the interaction terms on the two 
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sub-samples (Table 5). Models 1 and 3 have the non-lagged dependent variable; Models 2 and 
4 have the lagged one. A Chow test (DeMaris, 2004) shows that the difference between the 
coefficients of the two sets of regressions is statistically significant: F(36, 766) = 3.570, p < 
.001, for Model 1 vs. Model 3 and F(35, 690) = 3.459, p < .001 for Model 2 vs. Model 4. In 
Model 1 (scores below the median), the coefficients of the Carbon performance terms are 
statistically significant and indicate an inverse U-shape, while the coefficients become much 
more smaller and lose their statistical significance in Model 3. This confirms that higher 
levels of Environmental management tend to filter the negative impact of carbon performance 
on Tobin’s q. Results for the models with the lagged Tobin’s q are considerably weaker: only 
the quadratic term is statistically significant for the below-median group; however, 
significance disappears again in the above-median group. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
We studied whether the relationship between carbon emissions, environmental 
processes, and financial performance is sensitive to the geographical regions in which firms 
are based. Social and environmental performance in general is related to national institutions 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), and the private costs of carbon emissions in particular depend 
on local regulations that vary across countries. Table 6 shows the findings. We found a sharp 
contrast between firms from the US and UK, and firms from the other countries (Models 1a 
and 1b). The first group exhibits the inverse U-shaped relationship between Carbon 
performance and Tobin’s q (measured at t) that emerged in the whole sample, but 
Environmental management and the interactions are not statistically significant. The opposite 
is true for the other countries, where the terms of Carbon performance are not statistically 
significant, but Environmental management is positively and significantly related to Tobin’s q 
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and the interaction terms are aligned to Hypothesis 2. Therefore, it seems that Tobin’s q is 
sensitive to Carbon performance in the US and UK and to Environmental management in 
other countries.  
We investigated whether this result extends to further countries with an English legal 
origin (La Porta et al., 2006). However, we found that the magnitude of the coefficients 
decreases and that the statistical significance of Environmental management almost 
disappears (Models 2a and 2b). We also contrasted Annex B countries (signatories of the 
Tokyo Protocol that ratified it) and the other countries, assuming that in the former the 
internalized costs of carbon emissions for firms could be higher than in the latter. Models 3a 
and 3b show that this is not the case, since in the Annex B group no coefficients of our 
variables of interests were statistically significant. The same holds for Europe (including UK) 
versus other countries (Models 4a and 4b).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Considering financial performance measures other than Tobin’s q is useful because 
different measures may be affected by different stakeholders or express different channels 
through which environmental performance affect financial performance (Iwata and Okada, 
2011). Table 7 shows the results of applying our main specification to ROE, ROS, and ROA. 
Model 1 shows the usual inverse U-shaped relationship between Carbon performance and 
ROE while no effect is discernible for Environmental management. Magnitude and statistical 
significance of the coefficients decrease sharply when ROE is lagged forward by one year 
(Model 2). Qualitatively, the same results are obtained for ROA (Models 5 and 6). In contrast, 
the results for ROS closely mirror those obtained with Tobin’s q, with statistically significant 
effects for both Carbon performance and Environmental management, and for both non-
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lagged and lagged ROS. 
These findings corroborate previous research in which carbon emissions were more 
strongly linked to Tobin’s q than to accounting measures (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Fujii 
et al., 2013). Tobin’s q incorporates investor estimates about a firm’s future performance; 
therefore, it is more probable than accounting measures to reflect regulatory risks, emerging 
climate scenarios, or the benefits of long-term investments in emission reduction. Among the 
accounting measures we considered, ROS is the only one that does not depend on financial 
structure. Therefore, it directly reveals internal efficiency, the amount of transaction costs, or 
the extent of differentiation advantages, which are areas in which firms may reap the benefits 
from better stakeholder management or increased stakeholder influence. 
-------------------------------- 




This paper investigates the different effects of the outcome and process dimensions of firms’ 
environmental performance on Tobin’s q. We focus on an outcome—carbon emissions—that 
is highly relevant in a global context in which climate change poses unique challenges to all 
organizations (Howard-Grenville et al., 2014). We argue that there is a U-shaped relationship 
between carbon performance and Tobin’s q, and that environmental processes positively 
moderate this relationship, through their effects on stakeholder management and influence. To 
test our hypotheses, we use unbalanced panel data taken from a sample of 127 firms in 
carbon-intensive industries, observed over a seven-year period.  
The findings partially support our hypotheses. The U-shape is negative, in opposition 
to our expectations, meaning that carbon performance improves financial performance up to a 
24 
 
certain point, after which the marginal benefits (in terms of internal efficiency or improved 
reputation and legitimacy) of further reduction of carbon emissions do not offset the marginal 
cost. Our hypothesis that environmental processes positively moderate the relationship 
between carbon performance and Tobin’s q is confirmed. This suggests that investors and 
other stakeholders simultaneously assess a firm’s carbon performance and the firm’s efforts to 
reduce its environmental impact. Firms with high carbon performance that demonstrate a 
willingness to deal with environmental issues are rewarded with an increase in Tobin’s q. 
Therefore, for this limited set of firms the U-shape is positive, as predicted. Firms with high 
carbon performance and inadequate processes are negatively evaluated. An additional 
implication is that environmental performance at the process level adds to Tobin’s q only 
when a firm’s carbon performance is high or low, but not when its carbon performance falls 
into the intermediate range. 
Our results are robust to using a forward one-year lag for the dependent variable and 
to replacing Tobin’s q with ROS, while the moderation effect of Environmental management 
disappears with ROA and ROE. Splitting the sample at the geographical-region level shows a 
contrast between US and UK (where Tobin’s q mainly depends on Carbon performance) and 
the other countries (where it mainly depends on Environmental management). While this 
result needs further study, it confirms that unraveling the outcome and the process dimensions 
of environmental performance is a promising avenue of future research. Our analysis fails to 
find any significant difference between Annex B countries (or Europe) and other countries, 
which suggests that investors do not believe that costs or benefits coming from participation 
to Kyoto Protocol are sizeable. 
Our results have important implications. Understanding whether and when firms’ 
efforts to control their environmental impacts generate financial returns is clearly relevant for 
both business and policy makers. While our study highlights the financial benefits for firms 
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that are responsive to climate change, it also suggests that they do not usually internalize poor 
carbon performance. The average firm can be interested in improving its carbon performance 
up to a certain level, due to internal savings and benefits linked to improved relationships with 
stakeholders, but further abatement of emissions may need to be incentivized by policy 
measures. Differently, the firms with the best environmental processes are rewarded by the 
market for carbon reduction even without external stimulus. Therefore, policy makers should 
take into account firm differences in environmental processes in order to adjust incentives for 
carbon reduction.  
As with any empirical work, our study has some limitations that should be addressed 
in future research. Our sample focuses on carbon-intensive industries for which reduction of 
GHG emissions is a highly material issue; we expect that our findings could not generalize to 
industries with lower average levels of emissions. Moreover, our measure of environmental 
processes could be refined through the addition of a more precise division between process 
and outcome scores. Research that considers the effects of specific regulatory contexts in 
more depth should also be pursued, as the extent to which the costs of carbon emissions is 
internalized is highly dependent on historical and institutional conditions. 
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 Table 1 
Firm classification by sector and by country. Industries are defined according to GICS 
(Global Industry Classification Standard). Energy, industrials, materials, and utilities are 





Integrated Oil & Gas: 15 








Aluminium : 3 
Commodity Chemicals: 3 
Construction Materials: 5 
Diversified Chemicals: 9 
Diversified Metals & Mining: 8 
Fertilizers & Agricultural Chemicals: 2 
Gold: 3 
Industrial Gases: 3 
Paper Products: 5 




Electric Utilities: 20 
Gas Utilities: 2 















New Zealand: 2 
Norway: 1 




United Kingdom: 12 
USA: 39 
 










Mean Median Std dev Min Max Obs. 
Tobin’s q 1.36 1.18 0.56 0.58 5.36 766 
ROS 16.16 13.86 11.01 -0.11 37.21 766 
ROE 10.8 9.89 10.97 -12.68 40.53 766 
ROA 4.97 4.00 4.81 -2.62 15.71 766 
Size 16.95 17.00 1.21 13.17 19.69 766 
R&d intensity 0.57 0.00 1.40 0.00 11.71 766 
D/E 1.25 0.95 1.10 0.07 16.61 766 
Corp. governance score 74.83 84.57 23.88 1.57 96.78 766 
UN Global Compact 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 766 
Climate change inn. 0.96 0.00 2.69 0.00 35.34 766 
Carbon performance 3.36 2.99 1.56 0.20 11.56 766 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Tobin's q 1 
           2 ROS 0.42 1 
          3 ROE 0.45 0.44 1 
         4 ROA 0.54 0.49 0.88 1 
        5 Size -0.18 0.06 0.16 0.12 1 
       6 R&d intensity 0.14 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 1 
      7 D/E -0.13 -0.02 0.08 -0.22 0.06 -0.10 1 
     8 Corp. governance score 0.18 0.30 0.12 0.14 -0.03 -0.17 0.00 1 
    9 UN Global Compact -0.17 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.34 0.04 -0.05 -0.18 1 
   10 Climate change inn. -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.13 1 
  11 Carbon performance -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 0.12 0.05 -0.10 0.13 0.03 1 









 Table 4 
Carbon emissions, environmental management, and financial performance. Dependent 
variable: Tobin’s q. Year and country dummies included but not reported. Energy is the 
baseline case for industry dummies. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. ***, **, *, and † stand for p < .001, p < .01, p < .05, and p < .10, 
respectively. 
 
 Tobin’s q (t)  Tobin’s q (t + 1) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Carbon performance  0.0879* 0.0954*   0.0600† 0.0653* 
  (0.0411) (0.0427)   (0.0357) (0.0332) 
Quadratic carbon performance  -0.0100** -0.0108**   -0.0092** -0.0097*** 
  (0.0038) (0.0038)   (0.0031) (0.0029) 
Env. management  0.0056 0.3438**   0.0169 0.2591*** 
  (0.0196) (0.1196)   (0.0154) (0.0734) 
Env. man. * Carbon perf.   -0.1785**    -0.1193** 
   (0.0672)    (0.0394) 
Env. man. * Quad. carbon perf.   0.0200*    0.0118* 
   (0.0092)    (0.0050) 
Industrials -0.2012** -0.2029** -0.1970**  -0.1184 -0.1232 -0.1196 
 (0.0759) (0.0753) (0.0752)  (0.0820) (0.0817) (0.0809) 
Materials 0.1020 0.1076 0.1079  0.0863 0.0863 0.0838 
 (0.0703) (0.0697) (0.0696)  (0.0652) (0.0639) (0.0633) 
Utilities -0.2400*** -0.2419*** -0.2352***  -0.2561*** -0.2560*** -0.2510*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0520) (0.0523)  (0.0538) (0.0536) (0.0530) 
Size -0.0070 -0.0149 -0.0117  -0.0103 -0.0259 -0.0250 
 (0.0248) (0.0253) (0.0245)  (0.0222) (0.0228) (0.0225) 
R&D intensity 0.05966† 0.0563† 0.0551†  0.0675* 0.0672† 0.0663† 
 (0.0309) (0.0303) (0.0300)  (0.0263) (0.0260) (0.0254) 
D/E -0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0000  0.0483* 0.0477* 0.0484* 
 (0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0219)  (0.0242) (0.0237) (0.0234) 
Corp. governance score -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0011  0.0013 0.0003 -0.000 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
UN Global Compact -0.2103*** -0.2001*** -0.2006***  -0.1813*** -0.1750*** -0.1738*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0521) (0.0520)  (0.0490) (0.0493) (0.0491) 
Climate Change Innovation -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0028  0.0003 0.0009 -0.0000 
 (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0044)  (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Constant 1.5596** 1.5668** 1.5418**  1.4255*** 1.672*** 1.6883*** 
 (0.5017) (0.5106) (0.4956)  (0.4233) (0.4285) (0.4211) 
No of firms 127 127 127  127 127 127 
Observations 766 766 766  690 690 690 
R-squared 0.3273 0.3326 0.3408  0.3004 0.3130 0.3203 
F 10.80*** 10.01*** 9.50***  10.74*** 10.67*** 9.83*** 
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 Table 5 
Carbon emissions, environmental management, and financial performance by different levels 
of Environmental management. Dependent variable: Tobin’s q. Subsamples: (1) 
Environmental management ≤ median; (2) Environmental management > median. Number 
of firms do not add up because the same firm can figure in the two groups in different years. 
Year and country dummies included but not reported. Energy is the baseline case for industry 
dummies. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, 
**, *, and † stand for p < .001, p < .01, p < .05, and p < .10, respectively. 
 
 Env. management ≤ median  Env. management > median 
 Tobin’s q (t) Tobin’s q (t + 1)  Tobin’s q (t) Tobin’s q (t + 1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Carbon performance 0.1615** 0.0633  0.0148 0.0091 
 (0.0545) (0.0549)  (0.1037) (0.0635) 
Quadratic carbon performance -0.0161*** -0.0084†  -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.0045) (0.0046)  (0.0146) (0.0075) 
Industrials -0.3566*** -0.2102*  -0.0027 0.0496 
 (0.0881) (0.0985)  (0.1063) (0.1349) 
Materials 0.0282 -0.0455  0.4269** 0.4517** 
 (0.0764) (0.0729)  (0.1413) (0.1234) 
Utilities -0.2811*** -0.2749***  -0.1665* -0.1630† 
 (0.0721) (0.0804)  (0.0737) (0.0908) 
Size -0.0380 -0.0359  0.0580 0.0568 
 (0.0335) (0.0371)  (0.0425) (0.0365) 
R&D intensity 0.1360*** 0.1437***  -0.0689* -0.0356 
 (0.0348) (0.0252)  (0.0289) (0.0287) 
D/E 0.0106 0.0480  0.0224 0.0468 
 (0.0337) (0.0472)  (0.0386) (0.0305) 
Corp. Gov. Performance Score 0.0019† 0.0024  -0.0056† -0.0011 
 (0.0017) (0.0017)  (0.0033) (0.0030) 
UN Global Compact -0.2530*** -0.2453***  -0.1985* -0.1954** 
 (0.0670) (0.0660)  (0.0873) (0.0734) 
Climate Change Innovation 0.0059 0.0027  -0.0109 0.0052 
 (0.0048) (0.0044)  (0.0105) (0.0129) 
Constant 1.6196** 1.4512*  0.7098 0.3389 
 (0.6034) (0.6257)  (0.9359) (0.7467) 
No of firms 96 96  99 99 
Observations 383 345  383 345 
R-squared 0.5326 0.5101  0.3320 0.3788 
F 9.34*** 8.21***  4.98*** 7.08*** 
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 Table 6 
Carbon emissions, environmental management, and financial performance by region. Dependent 
variable: Tobin’s q. The “English legal origin” region is based on La Porta et al. (2006) and includes 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom and USA. The 
“Annex B” region consists in Australia, Japan, Switzerland and all the current EU countries. “Europe” 
includes UK. Year dummies included but not reported. Energy is the baseline case for industry 
dummies. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, **, *, 
and † stand for p < .001, p < .01, p < .05, and p < .10, respectively. 
 US and UK Others English legal 
origin 
Others Annex B Others Europe Others 
















 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Carbon performance 0.1623** 0.0021 0.1158* 0.0715 0.0151 0.1000* -0.1094 0.0535 
 (0.0560) (0.0567) (0.0466) (0.0722) (0.1077) (0.0487) (0.0897) (0.0488) 
Quad. carbon performance -0.0166** -0.0019 -0.0158*** -0.0053 -0.0031 -0.0130** 0.0063 -0.0096* 
 (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0078) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0043) 
Env. management 0.0697 0.5050* 0.1488 0.3472 0.4632 0.1821 -0.2096 0.2557† 
 (0.2021) (0.2068) (0.1421) (0.3237) (0.4832) (0.1229) (0.5480) (0.1369) 
Env. man. * Carbon perf. -0.0122 -0.2903* -0.0394 -0.2285 -0.2895 -0.0832 -0.0980 -0.1414† 
 (0.1249) (0.1166) (0.0884) (0.1623) (0.2322) (0.0742) (0.2535) (0.0844) 
Env. man. * Quad. carb. perf. -0.0039 0.0390* -0.0021 0.0351† 0.0343 0.0145 0.0248 0.0184 
 (0.0183) (0.0154) (0.0132) (0.0197) (0.0274) (0.0109) (0.0294) (0.0125) 
Industrials -0.6993*** -0.2011** -0.3818*** -0.1761* -0.4691*** -0.2481* -0.6481*** -0.1226 
 (0.1203) (0.0638) (0.0883) (0.0791) (0.1060) (0.1028) (0.1094) (0.0790) 
Materials -0.1440 0.2781*** 0.1921* -0.0879 -0.0706 0.2161** -0.3292** 0.2858** 
 (0.1135) (0.0773) (0.0844) (0.0886) (0.1263) (0.0814) (0.1144) (0.0868) 
Utilities -0.5184*** -0.1710*** -0.4062*** -0.1354** -0.284*** -0.3732*** -0.3209*** -0.2541** 
 (0.0932) (0.0478) (0.0741) (0.0508) (0.0690) (0.0752) (0.0787) (0.0797) 
Size -0.0536† 0.0096 -0.0132 -0.0254 -0.0279 -0.0630* -0.0397 -0.0119 
 (0.0311) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0254) (0.0287) (0.0302) (0.0274) (0.0374) 
R&D intensity 0.1162*** -0.0994*** 0.0739* -0.0347 -0.0581* 0.0921** 0.0183 0.0219 
 (0.0351) (0.0202) (0.0323) (0.0240) (0.0281) (0.0325) (0.0521) (0.0343) 
D/E 0.0129 0.0442 0.0269 0.0050 0.0085 0.0058 0.0082 0.0060 
 (0.0254) (0.0383) (0.0316) (0.0410) (0.0162) (0.0531) (0.0411) (0.0521) 
Corp. governance score 0.0056 0.0008 -0.0019 0.0015† 0.0019 -0.003† 0.0015 0.0030** 
 (0.0042) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0011) 
UN Global Compact -0.1996** -0.2314*** -0.2177*** -0.1534* -0.1097† -0.3292*** -0.3165*** -0.0767 
 (0.0757) (0.0522) (0.0599) (0.0699) (0.0606) (0.0637) (0.0837) (0.0583) 
Climate Change Innovation -0.0097 -0.0154** -0.0051 -0.0045† -0.0142** 0.0064 -0.0100* -0.0102 
 (0.0115) (0.0057) (0.0093) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0109) (0.0045) (0.0111) 
Constant 1.6967* 1.078* 1.5701** 1.5471** 1.8092* 2.5206*** 2.6449*** 1.0847† 
 (0.6648) (0.4953) (0.5341) (0.5269) (0.7048) (0.5850) (0.6681) (0.6531) 
No of firms 51 76 89 38 56 71 40 87 
Observations 300 466 524 242 362 404 261 505 
R-squared 0.4473 0.2826 0.3135 0.3316 0.2927 0.3936 0.4646 0.2728 





Carbon emissions, environmental management, and financial performance. Dependent 
variable: ROE (Return on equity), ROS (Return on sales), ROA (Return on assets). Year and 
country dummies included but not reported. Energy is the baseline case for industry dummies. 
The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, **, *, and 
† stand for p < .001, p < .01, p < .05, and p < .10, respectively. 
 
 ROE (t) ROE (t  + 1)  ROS (t) ROS (t + 1)  ROA (t) ROA (t + 1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Carbon performance 3.2016*** 0.8660  2.2643* 1.7743†  1.4389*** 0.7240 
 (0.8816) (1.0967)  (0.9091) (0.9531)  (0.3362) (0.4418) 
Quadratic carbon performance -0.3438*** -0.1769†  -0.2199** -0.1924*  -0.1431*** -0.0970* 
 (0.0844) (0.0996)  (0.0839) (0.0911)  (0.0311) (0.0391) 
Env. management 0.2187 0.3684  3.4346† 3.7029†  0.8161 0.4015 
 (2.0612) (2.1432)  (2.0685) (2.1548)  (0.8312) (0.8262) 
Env. man. * Carbon perf. 0.3788 0.2995  -2.5063* -2.5619*  -0.3021 -0.0354 
 (1.2382) (1.2205)  (1.1227) (1.2001)  (0.4830) (0.4591) 
Env. man. * Quad. carbon perf. -0.0313 0.0148  0.2839* 0.2981†  0.0356 0.0114 
 (0.1763) (0.1671)  (0.1425) (0.1560)  (0.0649) (0.0600) 
Industrials -3.6471 -5.1107*  -0.8306 -0.4506  -1.667** -1.7728* 
 (2.2729) (2.1607)  (1.8133) (2.0337)  (0.6161) (0.7266) 
Materials 0.0690 -1.5063  4.1955** 3.5155*  -0.2292 -0.6043 
 (1.4729) (1.4876)  (1.3338) (1.4238)  (0.5184) (0.5967) 
Utilities -4.4924* -7.6876***  3.0596* 2.3601†  -2.4187*** -2.7955*** 
 (2.2295) (1.5235)  (1.2007) (1.3617)  (0.4553) (0.5330) 
Size 1.8581*** 0.8602†  2.1927*** 1.8562***  0.6692*** 0.4311* 
 (0.5229) (0.4934)  (0.4462) (0.4932)  (0.1735) (0.1929) 
R&D intensity -0.0832 0.8394*  -0.1998 -0.0869  -0.0589 0.2308 
 (0.3794) (0.3346)  (0.2584) (0.2751)  (0.1433) (0.1536) 
D/E 1.5320 4.372***  -0.1546 -0.0021  -0.3909** 0.0964 
 (1.4622) (0.6838)  (0.3327) (0.5149)  (0.1485) (0.1970) 
Corp. governance score 0.0172 0.0100  0.0836* 0.0717*  0.0087 0.0020 
 (0.0361) (0.0382)  (0.0352) (0.0343)  (0.0122) (0.0139) 
UN Global Compact -3.0021** -2.6463*  -0.9946 -0.9342  -1.0912** -0.9200* 
 (1.0817) (1.1536)  (1.0076) (1.1249)  (0.3943) (0.4379) 
Climate Change Innovation -0.0959 0.0104  -0.1124 -0.0214  -0.0410 0.0077 
 (0.1595) (0.1790)  (0.1125) (0.1229)  (0.0527) (0.0605) 
Constant -32.6326** -10.9244  -35.653*** -24.4598**  -10.3388** -4.2200 
 (9.7785) (9.6819)  (8.839) (9.4828)  (3.3726) (3.7646) 
No of firms 127 127  127 127  127 127 
Obs 766 690  766 690  766 690 
R-squared 0.2477 0.2688  0.3248 0.3047  0.3000 0.235 





Moderating effect of Environmental management on the relationship between carbon 
performance and Tobin’s q (at t). The horizontal axis reports standard deviations, covering 
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